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Essay 
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.: 
Mistakes, Same-Sex Marriage, and Unintended 
Consequences 
Jeffrey M. Hirsch* 
I. Introduction 
In EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.,1 the Supreme Court 
examined the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition against religious discrimination 
during the application phase of employment.2  In particular, the Court 
considered whether a job applicant must tell the employer of a needed 
religious accommodation in order to bring a claim of religious discrimination 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.3  By answering that question in the 
negative, the decision has been heralded as a victory for religious employees 
and job applicants.4  Although certainly true on one level, it is not clear that 
Abercrombie is always beneficial to religious employees.  Indeed, the 
decision may have inadvertently penalized a certain class of religious job 
applicants. 
Title VII’s prohibition against religious discrimination is unusual on 
several different fronts.  First, unlike Title VII’s other protected classes, 
 
*  Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Geneva Yeargan Rand Distinguished Professor of 
Law, University of North Carolina School of Law. 
1. 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
2. Id. at 2031; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)).  The other  protected classes under Title 
VII are race, color, sex, and national origin.  See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1).  
3. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2032–34. 
4. See infra note 55. 




religion is arguably an immutable characteristic.5  Second, even when 
employees have a fixed religious faith, it is not always discernable by others.6  
Third, religion is defined not just by followers’ beliefs, but also by their 
practices.7  Relatedly, religious employees enjoy a protection under Title VII 
that no other protected class under that statute enjoys: a right to reasonable 
accommodation of religious beliefs and practices.8  As the Supreme Court 
emphasized in Abercrombie, this accommodation duty means that employers 
cannot hide behind facially neutral job rules, like the clothing policy at issue 
in the case.9  Rather, the accommodation requirement requires employers at 
times to favor religious beliefs and practices.10   
Finally, although individuals may care more about a given protected 
class, divisions on Title VII policy generally fall along pro-employer or pro-
employee lines.  But the fourth difference is that opinions about religious 
discrimination are far more complicated and frequently create odd 
bedfellows.  Religious employees enjoy support from a variety of disparate 
groups, from liberal civil liberty proponents to conservative religious 
organizations.11  Others’ support seem tied more to the particular religious 
beliefs at issue.  Thus, some supporters of the Muslim applicant in 
Abercrombie may be opposed to a conservative Christian seeking a religious 
accommodation to avoid same-sex marriage work.  
Given the uniqueness and variety of interests implicated by religious 
discrimination law, it is no surprise that the Court’s Abercrombie decision 
could result in countervailing effects.  It is a decision that, on one level, 
 
5. See Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement: Title VII’s 
Failure to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 457–58 
(2010) (discussing different views on whether religion is immutable).  One limited exception is the 
ability of individuals to change their sex. 
6. See Reed v. Great Lakes Cos., 330 F.3d 931, 935–36 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A person’s religion is 
not like his sex or race—something obvious at a glance.  Even if he wears a religious symbol, such 
as a cross or a yarmulka, this may not pinpoint his particular beliefs and observances . . . .”).  The 
other Title VII protected classes can raise this confusion issue, but to a less frequent extent than 
religion. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012); see infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra note 49 and accompanying text (describing Title VII’s religious reasonable 
accommodation test).  Although not present under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
contains a reasonable accommodation duty, albeit one with a much narrower undue hardship 
defense for employers.  See infra note 31. 
9. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (2015).  
10. Id. 
11. See ACLU Defense of Religious Practice and Expression, AM. C.L. UNION 
https://www.aclu.org/aclu-defense-religious-practice-and-expression?redirect=defendingreligion 
[https://perma.cc/4GGV-7262] (indicating an example of a liberal civil liberty proponent stating that 
it “vigorously defends the rights of all Americans to practice their religion”); In the Public Arena, 
LIBERTY INST., https://www.libertyinstitute.org/pages/issues/in-the-public-arena [https://perma.cc/ 
LK65-VMRZ] (serving as an example of a conservative organization that defends and restores 
“religious speech in the work place with no retribution for employees, employers, customers and 
vendors”). 
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undeniably provides religious employees a victory.  However, looking 
beneath the surface reveals a more complicated set of incentives that could 
harm some religious individuals—in particular, applicants who convey some 
signs of religious belief but do not need any accommodation of those beliefs.   
II. The EEOC v. Abercrombie Litigation: A Duty to Notify? 
In Abercrombie, the Supreme Court returned, for the first time in 
decades,12 to Title VII’s religious accommodation requirement.13  This time, 
the Court addressed whether a job applicant must notify an employer of any 
accommodation needs.14  The Court’s answer was a straightforward “no,”15 
but the potential effects of the decision are not so clear-cut. 
Abercrombie involved a job applicant, Samantha Elauf, who wore a 
headscarf according to the tenets of her Muslim faith.16  Elauf received a 
rating that qualified her to work for Abercrombie; however, she was 
ultimately rejected because a district manager determined that the headscarf 
would violated the company’s “Look Policy,” which forbids the wearing of a 
“cap.”17  The assistant manager who interviewed Elauf told the district 
manager that she thought Elauf wore the headscarf for religious reasons, but 
the company never confirmed that fact with Elauf, who was not made aware 
of the issue and did not volunteer an explanation.18 
The Tenth Circuit ruled in favor of Abercrombie, holding that Title VII 
imposed a notification requirement on applicants who need religious 
accommodations.19  In particular, the Tenth Circuit ruled that 1) an applicant 
must show that an employer possessed “actual knowledge” of a needed 
religious accommodation, and 2) that knowledge must result from the 
applicant’s providing a direct and “explicit notice” of the need for an 
accommodation.20  In other words, even if the employer knows that an 
applicant will need a religious accommodation, the claim would fail if that 
knowledge came from a source other than the applicant herself.  The court 
 
12. The Court’s previous examinations of the Title VII’s religious accommodation provision 
occurred in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977) and Ansonia Board of 
Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986). 
13. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2031. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 2033.  In announcing the decision, Justice Scalia even stated that the case was “really 
easy.”  See Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Allows Suit by Muslim Woman Who Says Headscarf Cost 
Her a Job, WASH. POST (June 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/supreme-court-
allows-suit-by-muslim-woman-who-says-head-scarf-cost-her-a-job/2015/06/01/977293f0-088c-
11e5-9e39-0db921c47b93_story.html [https://perma.cc/CP7C-JSX2]. 
16. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2031. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 
135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
20. Id. at 1134, 1136. 




based its holding of various grounds, including its interpretation of EEOC 
guidance,21 the reality that religion is personal to individuals and therefore an 
employer cannot be sure that a seemingly religious act is actually rooted in 
religion,22 and that the accommodation duty only arises when there is an 
actual conflict between an individual’s religious beliefs or practices and 
company policy.23 
The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s holding, stressing the 
definition of “religion” under Title VII.24  The primary antidiscrimination 
provision under Title VII—referred to as the “disparate treatment” 
prohibition—states that employers violate the statute when they discriminate 
against applicants or employees “because of” a protected class, which 
includes religion.25  Section 2(a) of Title VII defines “religion” as including 
“all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an 
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”26  In 
other words, to make out a successful claim under Title VII, an applicant 
must demonstrate that she was denied employment “because of” her religious 
observation, practice, or belief.27 
Abercrombie argued, as it had done successfully in the Tenth Circuit,28 
that an employer violates Title VII’s disparate treatment prohibition29 only if 
the applicant provided the employer with “actual knowledge” of the need for 
a religious accommodation and was rejected because the employer wanted to 
avoid the accommodation.30  The Court countered this argument in part by 
drawing a distinction between the Americans with Disabilities Act, which 
requires reasonable accommodation of a “known” physical or mental 
 
21. Id. at 1117–18, 1135–36. 
22. Id. at 1134–35. 
23. Id. at 1142. 
24. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 (2015).  The decision 
was authored by Justice Scalia, with a concurrence by Justice Alito and a dissent by Justice Thomas.  
Id. at 2031 (Scalia, J.); id. at 2034 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2037 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
25. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).  The 
Court also rejected Abercrombie’s argument that such claims can only be brought under the 
disparate impact theory, which prohibits certain neutral employer policies that disparately impact 
members of a protected class.  135 S. Ct. at 2033–34 (holding that the inclusion of practices as part 
of the definition of religion means that an employer’s rejection of an applicant based on a desire to 
avoid accommodating a religious practice is disparate treatment); see also 42 U.S.C. §2000e-
2(a)(2), (k) (establishing disparate impact claim). 
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). 
27. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2032. 
28. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1128 (10th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 
135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015). 
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
30. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2032. 
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limitation,31  to Title VII’s disparate treatment provision, which does not 
incorporate an express knowledge requirement.32  As a result, under 
Abercrombie, courts must treat allegations that an employer rejected an 
applicant out of a desire to avoid religious accommodation like other Title 
VII disparate treatment claims, which do not include a notice duty. 
As the Court noted, the disparate treatment framework under Title VII 
permits a plaintiff to prove discrimination by showing that unlawful 
discrimination was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s challenged 
decision.33  For plaintiffs like Elauf, this means that an applicant can 
establish a Title VII violation by demonstrating that a motivating factor in 
the employer’s rejection of their application was a desire to avoid a religious 
accommodation.34  An applicant’s notice to the employer of a need for 
religious accommodation can obviously help establish this motivation, but 
the Court stressed that notice is not required to prove that the employer was 
aware that there was a need for accommodation, which it wanted to avoid.35  
Moreover, whether or not the applicant notified the employer, she will 
generally need to show that the employer was either aware of her religious 
belief or practice, or at least suspected its existence.36 
III. The Unintended Consequences of Abercrombie 
Although commentators have accurately described Abercrombie as a 
victory for religious applicants,37 not all job seekers will benefit from the 
decision.  Individuals like Samantha Elauf—with outward, clear signals that 
they need some form of religious accommodation—will generally fare better 
under the Supreme Court’s decision, especially in comparison to the Tenth 
 
31. Id. at 2032–33 (citing  42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (stating that unlawful disability 
discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, 
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity”)). 
32. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033; 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). 
33. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2032 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (“[A]n unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though 
other factors also motivated the practice.”)).  The “motivating factor” analysis refers to the mixed-
motive framework, which involves cases where more than one reason motivated the employer.  In 
the alternative, Title VII also permits a plaintiff to prove discrimination by showing that the 
employer’s unlawful motivation was a “but-for” cause of the rejection or other adverse action.  See 
PAUL M. SECUNDA & JEFFREY M. HIRSCH, MASTERING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 62, 
66–68 (2010) (comparing but-for and motivating-factor causation). 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033. 
35. Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033.  This appeared to be the case in Abercrombie, where the 
employer suspected that she wore a headscarf for religious reasons.  Id. at 2031. 
36. Id. at 2033 n.3 (“While a knowledge requirement cannot be added to the motive 
requirement, it is arguable that the motive requirement itself is not met unless the employer at least 
suspects that the practice in question is a religious practice . . . .”). 
37. See infra note 54. 




Circuit’s notice rule.38  However, religious individuals who show less visible 
signs of faith may discover that Abercrombie has created an incentive system 
that makes it more difficult for them to find employment. 
Abercrombie’s most obvious effect is on job seekers whose religious 
affiliation, beliefs, or needs for accommodation are conspicuously revealed 
by their dress or grooming.  For these applicants, Abercrombie provides an 
attainable framework for challenging an employer’s refusal to hire.  Success 
is by no means guaranteed, as applicants must still provide evidence 
demonstrating that the employer’s decision was based on an unlawful 
motivation, a notoriously difficult task for Title VII refusal-to-hire claims.39  
But Abercrombie’s elimination of the Tenth Circuit’s notice requirement 
unquestionably eases the burden for applicants whose religious beliefs or 
practices conflict with work rules.  Moreover, by refusing to require 
applicants to raise the need for religious accommodations, Abercrombie 
upholds EEOC policies that seek to shield individuals from religious 
discrimination during the application process.40  It also gives applicants the 
opportunity to put off discussing needed religious accommodations until after 
they are hired, when employers are likely more amenable to finding a 
resolution than they would be during the hiring phase.41  Thus, for applicants 
with obvious religious accommodation needs, Abercrombie is a clear victory.   
But what of other applicants, such as those with more subtle religious 
garb or grooming?  Given the focus on job seekers with obvious religious 
accommodation needs—understandable given the facts of Abercrombie—
advocates for both employers and employees have seemed to ignore 
applicants who exhibit less conspicuous signs of faith.  This is unfortunate 
because Abercrombie will likely have an incongruous effect on these 
 
38. But see infra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
39. See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text; see also Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. 
Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 887 (2008) 
(describing hurdles to bringing Title VII claims); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment 
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 555 (2001). 
40. The EEOC cautions employers that they cannot lawfully ask applicants directly about their 
religious beliefs and practices, but should instead advise applicants of work rules and inquire 
whether applicants can comply with them.  See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, No. 
915.003, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL §§ 12-IV(A)(2) (Examples 30 and 31), 12-I(A)(3) (2008), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/religion.html [http://perma.cc/7JWG-D226]; Pre-Employment 
Inquiries and Religious Affiliation or Beliefs, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_religious.cfm [http://perma.cc/55PC-RT5E]; Best 
Practices for Eradicating Religious Discrimination in the Workplace, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/best_practices_religion.html 
[http://perma.cc/U73H-698S]; U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, No. 915.003, EEOC 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 12-IV(A) (2008). 
41. This tendency results from the fact that it is harder to win refusal-to-hire cases than 
termination cases, which makes it more risky for an employer to deny an accommodation to an 
incumbent employee.  See infra note 50 and accompanying text.  Moreover—although there will 
certainly be exceptions—employers will likely exhibit more flexibility with employees they know, 
rather than applicants they have just met. 
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individuals.  Indeed, the decision could affirmatively harm applicants who 
display their religiosity in a way that leaves open the question whether they 
will seek accommodations.   
Especially as compared to the Tenth Circuit’s notice rule, Abercrombie 
may have unintentionally created an incentive for employers not to hire 
applicants who raise even a risk of needing religious accommodations.  As a 
result, the decision might decrease the employment opportunities of all 
applicants who display subtle signs of religion, even if they have no intention 
of ever seeking accommodations.   
To see how this consequence may arise, take Kim Davis, the Rowan 
County, Kentucky magistrate who refused to issue same-sex marriage 
certificates on religious grounds.42  As an elected government official and 
head of her office, Davis’ case does not fit well under the Title VII 
framework, but her stand is one that many employees or applicants may 
share—particularly following the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell43 
upholding a constitutional right to such marriages.44  Consider then, a 
hypothetical situation in which Davis applies to a bakery and is rejected, 
allegedly because of the bakery’s belief that she will seek a religious 
accommodation allowing her to refuse to work on orders for same-sex 
weddings.   
Unless the bakery admitted the allegation, the most obvious challenge 
for Davis in this hypothetical would be proving that the bakery was 
motivated by a desire to avoid a religious accommodation.  Unlike Elauf’s 
 
42. See Sarah Kaplan & James Higdon, The Defiant Kim Davis, the Ky. Clerk who Refuses to 
Issue Gay Marriage Licenses, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
morning-mix/wp/2015/09/02/meet-kim-davis-the-ky-clerk-who-defying-the-supreme-court-refuses-
to-issue-gay-marriage-licenses/ [http://perma.cc/4KKL-2FN6]. 
43. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).   
44. See id. at 2590–91.  Even prior to Obergefell, employees have sought religious 
accommodations based on disapproval of gay individuals or same-sex unions.  See, e.g., Walden v. 
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 669 F.3d 1277, 1294–95 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
employer reasonably accommodated counselor who refused to work with same-sex couples by 
trying to assist her gaining new employment within company); Matthews v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
417 F. App’x 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that employer lawfully terminated Apostolic 
Christian employee rather than accommodate her religious beliefs through allowing her to admonish 
gay coworkers); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 608 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
employer lawfully terminated employee rather than accommodate his religious beliefs through 
allowing him to admonish gay coworkers and remove sexual orientation from its workplace 
diversity program); Somers v. EEOC, No. 6:13-00257, 2014 WL 1268582, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 
2014), aff’d, 589 F. App’x 178 (4th Cir. 2015) (dismissing employee’s claim that his employer—the 
EEOC—unlawfully refused to accommodate his religious objection to homosexuality by allowing 
him not to work on sexual orientation discrimination cases); Slater v. Douglas Cty., 743 F. Supp. 2d 
1188, 1192 (D. Or. 2010) (denying summary judgment to both parties in Title VII case involving 
county clerk’s refusal to accommodate employee’s religious objection to homosexuality by 
excusing her from all work related to domestic partnership registrations based on her belief); cf. 
Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., No. 14CA1351, 2015 WL 4760453, at *1 (Colo. App. Aug. 
13, 2015) (holding that a cake shop violated state public accommodation statute by refusing to sell 
wedding cake to same-sex couple). 




headscarf in Abercrombie, an applicant’s religious belief about same-sex 
marriage will often not be discernable.  But there may be some signs.  Davis, 
for example, is an Apostolic Christian—a faith in which female followers 
typically wear long, modest dresses; do not cut their hair; and do not wear 
makeup.45  Much like an applicant wearing a headscarf, if Davis appeared for 
a job interview, an employer that was aware of the religious motivations for 
these garb and grooming choices would suspect that she is a member of a 
conservative Christian faith that typically opposes same-sex marriage.46  But 
what if instead of Davis, the applicant was a conservative Christian who also 
has religious objections to same-sex marriage, but displays fewer signs of her 
faith?  For instance, the applicant may wear only a cross on a necklace or 
note church service on her resume.47  From the employer’s point of view, the 
cross and church reference could indicate a religious objection to same-sex 
marriage, but they could also simply be an indication that the individual is a 
Christian, many of whom support same-sex marriage.48  In short, applicants 
with subtle signs of religious belief send a signal to employers that there is a 
chance that accommodation will be requested; however, without further 
information, it is very difficult for employers to accurately distinguish 
applicants with accommodation needs from those without.   
This uncertainty becomes a problem for religious job seekers who apply 
to employers that want to avoid making religious accommodations—a 
normal stance for most businesses, which care more about serving customers 
than catering to employees’ religious beliefs and practices.49  For these 
“accommodation-avoiding employers,” the best outcome is to avoid hiring 
anyone who will raise religious accommodation issues.  To be sure, the 
religious accommodation analysis under Title VII is stacked in employers’ 
 
45. See Kaplan & Higdon, supra note 42. 
46. See Support for Same-Sex Marriage at Record High, but Key Segments Remain Opposed, 
PEW RES. CTR. (June 8, 2015) [hereinafter Pew Research Center], http://www.people-
press.org/2015/06/08/section-1-changing-views-of-same-sex-marriage/ [http://perma.cc/8NH5-
HYD3] (finding that only 27% of white evangelical Protestants support same-sex marriage).  Other 
religions require visible signs of faith.  See, e.g., Kalsi v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 
761 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 189 F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999) (granting summary judgment to employer 
that refused to accommodate Sikh employee who refused to wear hard hat because his religion 
requires wearing a turban); Brief of Religious Organizations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner 
at 7–9, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015) (No. 14-86), 2014 WL 
4253038, at *7–9 [hereinafter Brief of Religious Organizations] (discussing garb and grooming 
practices of certain Muslim, Sikh, Christian, and Jewish followers). 
47. Cf. Hellinger v. Eckerd Corp., 67 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1361, 1366 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (denying 
employer summary judgment in case involving pharmacist applicant who refused to sell condoms 
because of his religious belief; employer only learned of issue from a job reference). 
48. See Pew Research Center, supra note 46 (finding that support for same-sex marriage was 
62% among white mainline Protestants; 56% among Catholics; 33% among black Protestants; and 
27% among white evangelical Protestants). 
49. There are obvious exceptions.  See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751, 2785 (2014) (holding that a private-sector employer with religious objection to abortion rights 
does not have to provide health-insurance coverage for abortion-related medical expenses). 
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favor because they are permitted to deny any reasonable accommodation 
request that creates more than a de minimis cost.50  But even engaging in the 
accommodation process involves costs and risks that these employers would 
prefer to avoid.  As a result, most accommodation-avoiding employers would 
prefer not to hire applicants who present a mere risk that they will seek 
religious accommodations. 
Abercrombie, of course, makes clear that refusing to hire applicants 
because of a desire to avoid religious accommodation is unlawful.51  But 
refusal-to-hire cases are extremely hard to prove because of the secrecy and 
myriad factors involved in employers’ hiring decisions.52  As a result, 
employers will often be able to reject applicants because of an 
accommodation risk without ever being held to account.  However, 
employers are better able to engage in this behavior when faced with 
applicants with only subtle religious symbols, such as a cross, rather than 
those with more conspicuous signs.  The garb and grooming of certain 
Muslim, Christian, and other faiths with clear displays of religiosity53 make it 
more difficult for employers to deny knowledge of applicants’ religious 
beliefs and thereby improve the chances of any subsequent refusal-to-hire 
claims.  This reality means that accommodation-avoiding employers may be 
more willing to hire applicants with obvious signs of religion than applicants 
with more subtle displays.  The irony is that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Abercrombie may enhance this tendency.  
Consider the incentives created by both the Tenth Circuit’s holding in 
Abercrombie and the Supreme Court’s.  The Tenth Circuit’s notice rule 
would have sent a message to applicants that they should explicitly raise any 
needed religious accommodations during the application phase.  As a result, 
it is likely that something of a norm would have developed in which 
applicants give employers notice of their religious accommodation 
concerns.54  In contrast, the Supreme Court’s Abercrombie decision sends 
 
50. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (“To require [the employer] 
to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give [the employee] Saturdays off is an undue 
hardship.”); accord Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 67 (1986). 
51. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015) (“If the applicant actually requires an 
accommodation of that religious practice, and the employer's desire to avoid the prospective 
accommodation is a motivating factor in his decision, the employer violates Title VII.”). 
52. See Michael C. Duff, Union Salts as Administrative Private Attorneys General, 32 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 (2011) (noting that unlawful refusals to hire are “a notoriously 
difficult violation of law to police”) (citing Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: 
Using Testers to Uncover and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level 
Jobs, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 403, 409 (1993)). 
53. See Brief of Religious Organizations, supra note 46, at 7–9.  
54. There are limits to how widespread such a norm would become.  For instance, employees 
are notoriously unaware of most employment law rules.  See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with 
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133–46 (1997) (summarizing results of a study showing that the vast 
majority of employees had incorrect views about their rights against termination).  However, the 




applicants the opposite signal: do not worry about informing employers of 
any religious needs.55  
Compare the effects of these two decisions.  The Supreme Court’s rule 
is beneficial to applicants with obvious religious accommodation issues, such 
as Davis and Elauf, because it removes the Tenth Circuit’s notification 
hurdle.  This, in turn, makes it more difficult for accommodation-avoiding 
employers to reject job seekers like Davis and Elauf.  However, for 
applicants with more subtle signs of religion, the incentives are quite 
different.   
Under the Tenth Circuit’s rule, a notification norm is likely to prompt 
all applicants with religious accommodation concerns—even those wearing 
only a cross or showing other subtle signs of religion—to notify employers, 
while those without such concerns will not.  This provides valuable 
information for accommodation-avoiding employers that are unsure about 
applicants’ accommodation needs.  With a notification norm, these 
employers will have more certainty about whether an applicant poses a risk 
of accommodation: such applicants will likely state their needs.  The 
converse is also true because applicants’ failure to raise an accommodation 
issue will inform employers that those applicants likely do not pose an 
accommodation risk.  As a result, under a notification norm, accommodation-
avoiding employers will be more willing to hire applicants who exhibit subtle 
signs of religious belief but do not state a need for religious accommodation.   
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s Abercrombie decision creates the 
opposite effect.  By diminishing the notification norm, accommodation-
avoiding employers lack the information available under the Tenth Circuit’s 
 
existence of a notification rule would filter down to some number of applicants.  The establishment 
of a notice norm would also be hampered by applicants who may prefer to hide their 
accommodation needs in the hopes of avoiding rejection by an accommodation-avoiding employer.  
But the benefit of that strategy is undermined by the likelihood that an accommodation-avoiding 
employer will reject applicants with even subtle signs of religious needs.  Applicants with religious 
accommodation needs could still simply eliminate all signs of their religious belief, but individuals 
with strong enough beliefs to seek an accommodation are unlikely to remove all outward signs of 
their faith.  Given all of these uncertainties, it is hard to predict exactly what would have happened 
had the Tenth Circuit’s rule survived, but it appears likely that the rule would have caused some 
increase in the number of applicants who notify employers of religious accommodation needs. 
55. The actual message of Abercrombie, of course, is more complex than this simple message.  
For instance, the Court recognized that employer knowledge of an applicant’s religious beliefs will 
be helpful to an applicant’s claim of discrimination.  See supra note 36.  However, because of media 
coverage of the case, it appears that the overarching message to applicants is that no notice is 
required and may, in fact, invite discrimination.  See, e.g., Irin Carmon, Abercrombie & Fitch Loses 
Headscarf Case at Supreme Court, MSNBC (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/abercrombie-fitch-loses-headscarf-case-supreme-court 
[http://perma.cc/699Q-RBP7] (describing the Abercrombie decision: “The mall retailer had claimed 
it was only applying its supposedly neutral ‘Look Policy’ prohibiting caps, and that its conduct was 
legal because the job applicant, Samantha Elauf, didn’t explicitly ask for an accommodation.  But 
the court found that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the burden is on the employer not to 
discriminate in hiring.”). 
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rule.  Without notification, applicants displaying only crosses or other subtle 
religious symbols simply do not give employers much information about the 
risk that an accommodation request will come in the future.  Thus, risk-
averse employers will be less likely to hire any applicant with subtle signs of 
religious belief, even those who do not actually have any accommodation 
needs.56  It is true that, despite the lack of notice, Abercrombie provides these 
applicants an opportunity to show that an employer was motivated by a 
mistaken desire to avoid a religious accommodation request.57  But given the 
general difficulty in bringing refusal-to-hire claims, especially in cases 
involving only subtle signs of religiosity, that may not be a large benefit.  
And whatever value Abercrombie provides is likely outweighed by the fact 
that the applicant needs help at all; it would be far better for the applicant to 
be hired than to have a slightly easier path to challenge a rejection caused by 
an employer’s misplaced desire to avoid a religious accommodation. 
In sum, Abercrombie may decrease the employment prospects of 
applicants with subtle displays of religious belief—even those without actual 
accommodation needs—by making them more risky to employers.  
Applicants could mute this effect by concealing all signs of their faith, 
although most religious advocates would not favor that outcome.  Thus, for 
supporters of individuals with less conspicuous signs of religious belief, a 
notification norm may be preferable to a rule that decreases employers’ 
ability to weigh the risk of future accommodation issues. 
Abercrombie might also create a similarly harmful incentive on 
applicants.  Although the decision unequivocally assists the legal claims of 
job seekers who do not explicitly raise accommodation needs, that may come 
at the cost of lulling some into avoiding self-help.  Applicants are faced with 
the choice of either affirmatively raising their religious accommodation 
needs during the hiring process58 or keeping quiet and mentioning the issue 
once employed.  Abercrombie sends the signal that the latter strategy—no 
pre-hire notification—is preferred.  But perhaps nudging applicants to raise 
accommodation issues earlier makes more sense.59  Most employers can 
 
56. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033 (“[A]n employer who acts with the motive of avoiding 
accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that 
accommodation would be needed.”); Dallan F. Flake, After Abercrombie: Religious Discrimination 
Based on Employer Misperception, 2016 WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that 
Abercrombie suggests that plaintiffs can successfully bring Title VII cases challenging employer 
discrimination based on misperception of employees’ religious beliefs and practices). 
57. See Flake, supra note 56. 
58. Admittedly, this might short-circuit applicants’ chances of getting hired, but that is less 
likely to be true for applicants with obvious signs of religion, who will face the risk of 
discrimination no matter what they say. 
59. Indeed, before the Tenth Circuit, the EEOC argued that some notice of the need for 
religious accommodation was required—either from the applicant or from some other source.  
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 731 F.3d 1106, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 
2028 (2015). 




come up with legitimate rationales for rejecting applicants; however, that 
strategy is more difficult when there has been explicit notice or other obvious 
signs of an accommodation need.60  In other words, Abercrombie sends a 
signal to applicants with subtle signs of religiosity that they should not 
express their religious accommodation concerns when, in practice, they 
might be better off doing so.61   
The incentives of both employers and employees under a no-notification 
scheme show that Abercrombie’s effects will not always be clear.  In contrast 
to the view that Abercrombie is a clear victory for all religious individuals, 
the decision could end up harming applicants that display subtle signs of 
faith, whether or not they actually need accommodations.  That is not to say 
that the Court erred in its analysis of the question in Abercrombie—it did 
not—yet advocates, policymakers, and courts should be more concerned with 
the possible unintended consequences of their decisions.  It remains to be 
seen whether individuals with subtle signs of religiosity will suffer in any 
measurable degree due to Abercrombie.  We will never know, however, 
unless we remain attuned to the possibility. 
IV. Conclusion 
The discussion of Abercrombie’s possible harms is not intended as a 
criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision, which was on sounder legal 
footing than the Tenth Circuit’s.  The Court’s decision also had the benefit of 
mitigating some of the costs that would have occurred under Tenth Circuit’s 
notice rule, such as the penalty imposed on religious applicants who are 
unaware of the employers’ policies and therefore do not know that there is a 
religious accommodation issue.62  Similarly, the Court cannot be faulted for 
failing to consider issues beyond those presented in the case.  But 
policymakers and advocates should be more inquisitive about how legal rules 
affect incentives, particularly within a broader legal scheme like Title VII. 
For instance, recent legislation to narrow the scope of employers’ undue 
hardship defense is intended to provide greater opportunities for workplace 
religious accommodations.63  However, if Congress enacted such a measure, 
one possible effect is that employers will be more resistant to hiring 
 
60. For this reason, the incentive effect of Abercrombie on applicants with obvious signs of 
religion would be negligible, as employers will generally already be aware that those individuals 
have accommodation needs. 
61. On the other hand, there is a risk that providing express notice of an accommodation need 
will increase the chance that an employer will reject the applicant. 
62. See Brief of Petitioner at 28, EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028 
(2015) (No. 14-86), 2014 WL 6845691, at *28. 
63. See Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2013, S. 3686, 112th Cong. § 4(a)(3) (2013) 
(changing Title VII”s definition of undue hardship to “a significant difficulty or expense on the 
conduct of the employer’s business”); see also supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing the 
reasonable religious accommodation duty and undue hardship defense). 
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applicants who appear to need religious accommodation or even provide a 
risk of such need.  This does not mean that policymakers who want to 
enhance protection for religious employees should not pursue reforms of the 
undue hardship test.  But the possible negative effect on the employment of 
religious individuals might change the cost-benefit calculus of a particular 
proposal.  Even if it does not have that effect, some policymakers who 
consider these consequences might be prompted to address other 
shortcomings in antidiscrimination law, such as the difficulties in litigating 
refusal-to-hire claims and low-wage employees’ inability to enforce their 
workplace rights.64 
The possible unintended consequences of Abercrombie, like the undue 
hardship proposal, serves as a reminder that attempts to sway policy in a 
certain direction must account for outcomes that could undermine the 
reformers’ goals.  It is always difficult to engage in this type of inquiry, 
especially with statutes as complicated as Title VII, and the task is even more 
challenging with polarized topics such as religion.  Yet, if Title VII and other 
legal schemes have any hope at achieving their aims, it is imperative that 
advocates, policymakers, and—when appropriate—judges attempt to 
overcome these hurdles and explore the less obvious consequences of their 
actions. 
 
64. See Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: 
Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 458–60 (2014) (discussing studies on 
win rates in employment cases, which show lower rates for low-wage plaintiffs) (citing, among 
other studies, Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An 
Empirical Comparison (N.Y. Univ. Sch. Of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory Paper Series, 
Research Paper No. 65, 2003)); Duff, supra note 52, at 3. 
